Strengthening SDN Security: Protocol Dialecting and Downgrade Attacks

TL;DR

This paper proposes a protocol dialecting approach to enhance SDN security by providing additional authentication independent of TLS, effectively mitigating downgrade attacks with minimal performance impact.

Contribution

It introduces and evaluates two dialecting methods for OpenFlow that add per-message authentication, strengthening security against downgrade attacks beyond TLS.

Findings

Modest latency increase of less than 22% observed.

Dialecting approaches provide robustness against downgrade attacks.

Performance impact remains acceptable for practical deployment.

Abstract

Software-defined networking (SDN) has become a fundamental technology for data centers and 5G networks. In an SDN network, routing and traffic management decisions are made by a centralized controller and communicated to switches via a control channel. Transport Layer Security (TLS) has been proposed as its single security layer; however, use of TLS is optional and connections are still vulnerable to downgrade attacks. In this paper, we propose the strengthening of security assurance using a protocol dialecting approach to provide additional and customizable security. We consider and evaluate two dialecting approaches for OpenFlow protocol operation, adding per-message authentication to the SDN control channel that is independent of TLS and provides robustness against downgrade attacks in the optional case of TLS implementation. Furthermore, we measure the performance impact of using these dialecting primitives in a Mininet experiment. The results show a modest increase of communication latency of less than 22%.