Solving Zero-Sum One-Sided Partially Observable Stochastic Games
Karel Hor\'ak, Branislav Bo\v{s}ansk\'y, Vojt\v{e}ch, Kova\v{r}\'ik, Christopher Kiekintveld

TL;DR
This paper introduces a comprehensive approach to solving one-sided partially observable stochastic games, providing theoretical analysis, algorithms, and empirical results in pursuit-evasion, patrolling, and search scenarios.
Contribution
It offers the first complete solution framework for one-sided POSGs, including convergence proofs, heuristic algorithms, and practical strategies for complex domains.
Findings
Algorithm converges in non-trivial domains
Effective strategies derived from approximate value functions
Scalable solutions demonstrated in pursuit-evasion, patrolling, and search games
Abstract
Many security and other real-world situations are dynamic in nature and can be modelled as strictly competitive (or zero-sum) dynamic games. In these domains, agents perform actions to affect the environment and receive observations -- possibly imperfect -- about the situation and the effects of the opponent's actions. Moreover, there is no limitation on the total number of actions an agent can perform -- that is, there is no fixed horizon. These settings can be modelled as partially observable stochastic games (POSGs). However, solving general POSGs is computationally intractable, so we focus on a broad subclass of POSGs called one-sided POSGs. In these games, only one agent has imperfect information while their opponent has full knowledge of the current situation. We provide a full picture for solving one-sided POSGs: we (1) give a theoretical analysis of one-sided POSGs and their…
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Taxonomy
TopicsMilitary Defense Systems Analysis · Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis · Information and Cyber Security
