Two-way Unclonable Encryption with a vulnerable sender
Daan Leermakers, Boris Skoric

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel two-way quantum encryption protocol that remains secure even if the sender's keys are leaked after transmission, addressing scenarios with resource-constrained or vulnerable parties.
Contribution
It presents a new unclonable encryption protocol allowing key leakage post-protocol and demonstrates its security and key reusability in noisy quantum channels.
Findings
Protocol satisfies unclonable encryption criteria
Message remains secure despite key leakage
Constructs a high-rate two-way QKD scheme
Abstract
Unclonable Encryption, introduced by Gottesman in 2003, is a quantum protocol that guarantees the secrecy of a successfully transferred classical message even when all keys leak at a later time. We propose an Unclonable Encryption protocol with the additional property that the sender's key material is allowed to leak even in the case of an unsuccessful run. This extra feature makes it possible to achieve secure quantum encryption even when one of the parties is unable to protect its keys against after-protocol theft. Such an asymmetry occurs e.g. in case of server-client scenarios, where the client device is resource-constrained and/or located in a hostile environment. Our protocol makes use of a bidirectional quantum channel in a manner similar to the two-way protocol LM05. Bob sends random qubit states to Alice. Alice flips the states in a way that depends on the message and a…
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