Power in Liquid Democracy
Yuzhe Zhang, Davide Grossi
TL;DR
This paper introduces a new power index for liquid democracy, analyzing influence dynamics and power inequalities through theoretical modeling and simulations.
Contribution
It develops a novel power index for delegable voting systems, extends a game-theoretic model to include power-seeking behavior, and analyzes equilibrium and inequality emergence.
Findings
Power index characterized axiomatically
Existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria analyzed
Simulations show parameters influence power inequalities
Abstract
The paper develops a theory of power for delegable proxy voting systems. We define a power index able to measure the influence of both voters and delegators. Using this index, which we characterize axiomatically, we extend an earlier game-theoretic model by incorporating power-seeking behavior by agents. We analytically study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in such a model. Finally, by means of simulations, we study the effect of relevant parameters on the emergence of power inequalities in the model.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications