Double C-NOT attack on a single-state semi-quantum key distribution protocol and its improvement
Jun Gu, Tzonelih Hwang

TL;DR
This paper analyzes a semi-quantum key distribution protocol and reveals a vulnerability to a double C-NOT attack, proposing a modification to enhance its security against such attacks.
Contribution
It identifies a specific security flaw in a recent semi-quantum key distribution protocol and proposes an effective modification to prevent the double C-NOT attack.
Findings
Double C-NOT attack can compromise the protocol without detection.
Proposed modification effectively prevents the attack.
Enhanced security of the semi-quantum key distribution protocol.
Abstract
Recently, Zhang et al. proposed a single-state semi-quantum key distribution protocol (Int. J. Quantum Inf, 18, 4, 2020) to help a quantum participant to share a secret key with a classical participant. However, this study shows that an eavesdropper can use a double C-NOT attack to obtain parts of the final shared key without being detected by the participants. To avoid this problem, a modification is proposed here.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Information and Cryptography · Quantum Mechanics and Applications · Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture
