TL;DR
This paper develops and evaluates bounded rational game-theoretic models of human driving behavior within hierarchical multi-agent planning, using real-world data to identify the most accurate behavioral models for autonomous vehicle integration.
Contribution
It formalizes solution concepts for hierarchical games under bounded rationality and evaluates these models against naturalistic driving data, highlighting the most effective behavioral assumptions.
Findings
Quantal level-k model best fits maneuver data
Bounds sampling and maxmax models excel in trajectory prediction
Situational factors significantly influence model performance
Abstract
With autonomous vehicles (AV) set to integrate further into regular human traffic, there is an increasing consensus on treating AV motion planning as a multi-agent problem. However, the traditional game-theoretic assumption of complete rationality is too strong for human driving, and there is a need for understanding human driving as a \emph{bounded rational} activity through a behavioural game-theoretic lens. To that end, we adapt four metamodels of bounded rational behaviour: three based on Quantal level-k and one based on Nash equilibrium with quantal errors. We formalize the different solution concepts that can be applied in the context of hierarchical games, a framework used in multi-agent motion planning, for the purpose of creating game theoretic models of driving behaviour. Furthermore, based on a contributed dataset of human driving at a busy urban intersection with a total of…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Code & Models
Videos
