MIRAGE: Mitigating Conflict-Based Cache Attacks with a Practical Fully-Associative Design
Gururaj Saileshwar, Moinuddin Qureshi

TL;DR
Mirage is a practical fully-associative cache design that prevents conflict-based side-channel attacks by randomly selecting eviction candidates from all cache lines, ensuring robust security with minimal performance overhead.
Contribution
This paper introduces Mirage, a fully-associative cache architecture with a novel lookup and eviction mechanism that effectively mitigates conflict-based cache attacks.
Findings
Provides near-perfect global eviction property over system lifetime
Achieves only 2% slowdown compared to non-secure cache
Adds 17-20% extra storage overhead
Abstract
Shared processor caches are vulnerable to conflict-based side-channel attacks, where an attacker can monitor access patterns of a victim by evicting victim cache lines using cache-set conflicts. Recent mitigations propose randomized mapping of addresses to cache lines to obfuscate the locations of set-conflicts. However, these are vulnerable to new attacks that discover conflicting sets of addresses despite such mitigations, because these designs select eviction-candidates from a small set of conflicting lines. This paper presents Mirage, a practical design for a fully associative cache, wherein eviction candidates are selected randomly from all lines resident in the cache, to be immune to set-conflicts. A key challenge for enabling such designs in large shared caches (containing tens of thousands of cache lines) is the complexity of cache-lookup, as a naive design can require…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSecurity and Verification in Computing · Cloud Data Security Solutions · Parallel Computing and Optimization Techniques
