Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users
Negin Golrezaei, Vahideh Manshadi, Jon Schneider, Shreyas Sekar

TL;DR
This paper develops robust product ranking algorithms that effectively counteract fake user manipulation, ensuring optimal rankings even when platforms cannot distinguish between real and fake users.
Contribution
It introduces novel algorithms for product ranking that are robust to fake user manipulation, applicable in both known and unknown fake user scenarios.
Findings
Algorithms converge to optimal rankings under fake user manipulation.
Proposed methods outperform existing algorithms in worst-case scenarios.
Robustness is achieved through product-ordering graphs and multi-level cross-learning.
Abstract
In many online platforms, customers' decisions are substantially influenced by product rankings as most customers only examine a few top-ranked products. Concurrently, such platforms also use the same data corresponding to customers' actions to learn how these products must be ranked or ordered. These interactions in the underlying learning process, however, may incentivize sellers to artificially inflate their position by employing fake users, as exemplified by the emergence of click farms. Motivated by such fraudulent behavior, we study the ranking problem of a platform that faces a mixture of real and fake users who are indistinguishable from one another. We first show that existing learning algorithms---that are optimal in the absence of fake users---may converge to highly sub-optimal rankings under manipulation by fake users. To overcome this deficiency, we develop efficient…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSpam and Phishing Detection · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Blood donation and transfusion practices
