A First Look at Zoombombing
Chen Ling, Utkucan Balc{\i}, Jeremy Blackburn, Gianluca, Stringhini

TL;DR
This paper provides the first data-driven analysis of zoombombing, revealing insiders with legitimate access are the main perpetrators, which challenges existing security measures and suggests creating unique join links as the best defense.
Contribution
It offers a novel analysis of zoombombing calls on social media, highlighting insider threats and evaluating the effectiveness of current security practices.
Findings
Most zoombombing calls are made by insiders with legitimate access.
Insiders instruct attackers to mimic legitimate participants to evade detection.
Creating unique join links per participant is the most effective defense.
Abstract
Online meeting tools like Zoom and Google Meet have become central to our professional, educational, and personal lives. This has opened up new opportunities for large scale harassment. In particular, a phenomenon known as zoombombing has emerged, in which aggressors join online meetings with the goal of disrupting them and harassing their participants. In this paper, we conduct the first data-driven analysis of calls for zoombombing attacks on social media. We identify ten popular online meeting tools and extract posts containing meeting invitations to these platforms on a mainstream social network, Twitter, and on a fringe community known for organizing coordinated attacks against online users, 4chan. We then perform manual annotation to identify posts that are calling for zoombombing attacks, and apply thematic analysis to develop a codebook to better characterize the discussion…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
