Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks

TL;DR

This paper introduces a framework for robust coalitional games on dynamic networks, proposing distributed algorithms for payoff allocation that ensure convergence to a stable solution despite uncertain and varying coalition values.

Contribution

It formalizes the robust CORE concept and develops two distributed algorithms with proven convergence on time-varying networks, addressing uncertainty in coalition values.

Findings

Algorithms converge to a stable payoff distribution

Framework applicable to energy storage optimization

Handles uncertainty and dynamics in coalition values

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust CORE". Our main contribution is to design two distributed algorithms, namely, distributed payoff allocation and distributed bargaining, that converge to a consensual payoff distribution in the robust CORE. We adopt an operator-theoretic perspective to show convergence of both algorithms executed on time-varying communication networks. An energy storage optimization application motivates our framework for "robust coalitional games".