Reconstructing William Lane Craig's Explanation of Absolute Time based on Mulla Sadra's Philosophy
M. S. Kavyani, H. Razmi, H. Parsania

TL;DR
This paper critiques William Lane Craig's interpretation of absolute time, reconstructs it using Mulla Sadra's philosophy, and argues for a metaphysical basis for general time in nature, bridging physics and metaphysics.
Contribution
It offers a novel reconstruction of Craig's absolute time explanation through Mulla Sadra's metaphysics, enhancing the philosophical understanding of time.
Findings
Craig's interpretation relies on supernatural assumptions
Reconstruction using Mulla Sadra's philosophy supports natural general time
The approach bridges metaphysics and physics more effectively
Abstract
After the advent of the theory of special relativity, the existence of absolute time in nature was rejected within the society of physics. In recent decades, William Lane Craig has endeavoured to offer an interpretation of the empirical evidence that support the theory of relativity while maintaining the concept of absolute time. His interpretation, however, is based upon supernatural presuppositions due to which it cannot be accepted as a scientific argument. Here, after explaining Craig's view, we attempt to reconstruct his explanation for absolute time using the concept of general substantial motion of nature, well-known in Mulla Sadra's philosophy as the most important approach in Islamic philosophy; thereby, proving general time for the natural world. Although Craig considers some evidence from modern physics in his reasoning for absolute time, in this paper, after pointing to some…
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Taxonomy
TopicsMedieval and Classical Philosophy · Education and Islamic Studies · Islamic Studies and History
