MAKE: a Matrix Action Key Exchange
Nael Rahman, Vladimir Shpilrain

TL;DR
This paper introduces MAKE, a novel public key exchange protocol utilizing a semidirect product of matrix groups over Z_p, which enhances security by preventing exposure of matrix powers and resisting standard cryptographic attacks.
Contribution
The paper proposes a new matrix-based key exchange protocol based on semidirect products, avoiding exposure of matrix powers and resisting known cryptanalytic methods.
Findings
Protocol leverages matrix operations for diffusion.
No matrix powers are exposed, enhancing security.
Resistant to classical and quantum attacks.
Abstract
We offer a public key exchange protocol based on a semidirect product of two cyclic (semi)groups of matrices over Z_p. One of the (semi)groups is additive, the other one multiplicative. This allows us to take advantage of both operations on matrices to diffuse information. We note that in our protocol, no power of any matrix or of any element of Z_p is ever exposed, so all standard attacks on Diffie-Hellman-like protocols (including Shor's quantum algorithm attack) are not applicable.
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