Quantum epistemology and constructivism
Patrick Fraser, Nuriya Nurgalieva, L\'idia del Rio

TL;DR
This paper explores the compatibility of constructivist epistemology with quantum theory, demonstrating that if quantum inferences are considered knowledge, then constructivism cannot be fully upheld, supported by logical and theorem-based analysis.
Contribution
It provides a formal derivation showing the incompatibility of constructivism with quantum theory using logical frameworks and the Frauchiger-Renner theorem.
Findings
Constructivism conflicts with quantum inferences as knowledge.
The derivation aligns with both intuitionistic and quantum logic.
The result is supported by the Frauchiger-Renner theorem.
Abstract
Constructivist epistemology posits that all truths are knowable. One might ask to what extent constructivism is compatible with naturalized epistemology and knowledge obtained from inference-making using successful scientific theories. If quantum theory correctly describes the structure of the physical world, and if quantum theoretic inferences about which measurement outcomes will be observed with unit probability count as knowledge, we demonstrate that constructivism cannot be upheld. Our derivation is compatible with both intuitionistic and quantum propositional logic. This result is implied by the Frauchiger-Renner theorem, though it is of independent importance as well.
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