An optimal test for strategic interaction in social and economic network formation between heterogeneous agents
Andrin Pelican, Bryan S. Graham

TL;DR
This paper develops an optimal statistical test to detect strategic interactions in social and economic network formation among heterogeneous agents, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and various network preferences.
Contribution
It introduces a size-controlled, power-optimized test for strategic network formation, utilizing an exponential family structure and a novel MCMC algorithm for null distribution simulation.
Findings
The test controls size exactly despite nuisance parameters.
It can detect many common strategic network formation models.
A new MCMC algorithm facilitates feasible implementation.
Abstract
Consider a setting where players, partitioned into observable types, form a directed network. Agents' preferences over the form of the network consist of an arbitrary network benefit function (e.g., agents may have preferences over their network centrality) and a private component which is additively separable in own links. This latter component allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the costs of sending and receiving links across agents (respectively out- and in- degree heterogeneity) as well as homophily/heterophily across the types of agents. In contrast, the network benefit function allows agents' preferences over links to vary with the presence or absence of links elsewhere in the network (and hence with the link formation behavior of their peers). In the null model which excludes the network benefit function, links form independently across dyads in the manner…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Code & Models
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Business Strategy and Innovation
