Corruption and Audit in Strategic Argumentation

TL;DR

This paper enhances a strategic argumentation model to detect previously unnoticed corrupt behaviors, ensuring strategic aims are resistant to corruption, thereby improving the robustness of agent disputation and negotiation frameworks.

Contribution

It introduces a strengthened model of corruption detection in strategic argumentation, addressing limitations of prior formulations and ensuring resistance to corrupt behaviors.

Findings

Enhanced model detects previously unnoticed corrupt behaviors

All strategic aims are resistant to corruption under the new model

Improved robustness of agent disputation and negotiation

Abstract

Strategic argumentation provides a simple model of disputation and negotiation among agents. Although agents might be expected to act in our best interests, there is little that enforces such behaviour. (Maher, 2016) introduced a model of corruption and resistance to corruption within strategic argumentation. In this paper we identify corrupt behaviours that are not detected in that formulation. We strengthen the model to detect such behaviours, and show that, under the strengthened model, all the strategic aims in (Maher, 2016) are resistant to corruption.