BlindSignedID: Mitigating Denial-of-Service Attacks on Digital Contact Tracing
Bo-Rong Chen, Yih-Chun Hu

TL;DR
This paper introduces BlindSignedID, a privacy-preserving digital contact tracing method that significantly reduces the impact of denial-of-service attacks by verifying ephemeral identifiers, enhancing security without compromising privacy.
Contribution
The paper presents BlindSignedID, a novel approach that mitigates DoS attacks on digital contact tracing while maintaining privacy protections.
Findings
BlindSignedID reduces bogus EphIDs by over 90%.
Four attackers can cause gigabyte-level DoS attacks within hours.
The method effectively limits the success of MAC-compliant DoS attacks.
Abstract
Due to the recent outbreak of COVID-19, many governments suspended outdoor activities and imposed social distancing policies to prevent the transmission of SARS-CoV-2. These measures have had severe impact on the economy and peoples' daily lives. An alternative to widespread lockdowns is effective contact tracing during an outbreak's early stage. However, mathematical models suggest that epidemic control for SARS-CoV-2 transmission with manual contact tracing is implausible. To reduce the effort of contact tracing, many digital contact tracing projects (e.g., PEPP-PT, DP-3T, TCN, BlueTrace, Google/Apple Exposure Notification, and East/West Coast PACT) are being developed to supplement manual contact tracing. However, digital contact tracing has drawn scrutiny from privacy advocates, since governments or other parties may attempt to use contact tracing protocols for mass surveillance. As…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
