Positionality-Weighted Aggregation Methods for Cumulative Voting
Takeshi Kato, Yasuhiro Asa, Misa Owa

TL;DR
This paper introduces new weighted aggregation methods for cumulative voting that better reflect minority opinions, aiming to improve consensus-building in pluralistic social decision-making.
Contribution
It formulates three novel weighted aggregation methods based on quadratic and linear voting, incorporating minority positionality and normal distribution assumptions.
Findings
Minority opinions are proportionally reflected in two of the proposed methods.
Aggregation results can visualize minority number and positionality.
Methods facilitate mutual understanding in consensus processes.
Abstract
Respecting minority opinions is vital in solving social problems. However, minority opinions are often ignored in general majority rules. To build consensus on pluralistic values and make social choices that consider minority opinions, we propose aggregation methods that give weighting to the minority's positionality on cardinal cumulative voting. Based on quadratic and linear voting, we formulated three weighted aggregation methods that differ in the ratio of votes to cumulative points and the weighting of the minority to all members, and assuming that the distributions of votes follow normal distributions, we calculated the frequency distributions of the aggregation results. We found that minority opinions are more likely to be reflected proportionately to the average of the distribution in two of the above three methods. This implies that Sen and Gotoh's idea of considering the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsMulti-Criteria Decision Making · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Game Theory and Voting Systems
