Certificate and Signature Free Anonymity for V2V Communications

TL;DR

This paper introduces innovative V2V communication schemes that ensure security and privacy features like anonymity and non-repudiation without traditional certificates, relying instead on number theory-based cryptography.

Contribution

The paper proposes novel V2V schemes that eliminate the need for certificates and signatures, simplifying key management while maintaining security and privacy.

Findings

Schemes provide authentication, anonymity, and non-repudiation without certificates.

Security relies on hard number theory problems.

Guarantees hold even with colluding malicious parties below a threshold.

Abstract

Anonymity is a desirable feature for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications, but it conflicts with other requirements such as non-repudiation and revocation. Existing, pseudonym-based V2V communications schemes rely on certificate generation and signature verification. These schemes require cumbersome key management, frequent updating of certificate chains and other costly procedures such as cryptographic pairings. In this paper, we present novel V2V communications schemes, that provide authentication, authorization, anonymity, non-repudiation, replay protection, pseudonym revocation, and forward secrecy without relying on traditional certificate generation and signature verification. Security and privacy of our schemes rely on hard problems in number theory. Furthermore, our schemes guarantee security and privacy in the presence of subsets of colluding malicious parties, provided that the cardinality of such sets is below a fixed threshold.