On seat allocation problem with multiple merit lists

TL;DR

This paper introduces a straightforward, transparent algorithm for joint seat allocation with multiple merit lists, improving efficiency and trust in systems like India's engineering seat allocation.

Contribution

It proposes a simple, natural algorithm for multiple merit list seat allocation that is not based on deferred acceptance, enhancing transparency and efficiency.

Findings

Algorithm's running time is proportional to sum of separate allocations

Algorithm is straightforward and transparent

Applicable to systems with multiple merit lists

Abstract

In this note, we present a simpler algorithm for joint seat allocation problem in case there are two or more merit lists. In case of two lists (the current situation for Engineering seats in India), the running time of the algorithm is proportional to sum of running time for two separate (delinked) allocations. The algorithm is straight forward and natural and is not (at least directly) based on deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley. Each person can only move higher in his or her preference list. Thus, all steps of the algorithm can be made public. This will improve transparency and trust in the system.