Neural and phenotypic representation under the free-energy principle
Maxwell J. D. Ramstead, Casper Hesp, Alec Tschantz, Ryan Smith, Axel, Constant, Karl Friston

TL;DR
This paper uses the free-energy principle and active inference to develop a general theory of how living organisms form distributed representations of their environment through neural ensembles, emphasizing emergent, probabilistic encoding.
Contribution
It introduces a novel theoretical framework linking active inference, Markov blankets, and information geometry to explain phenotypic representation in biological systems.
Findings
Simulations show self-organizing agents encode stimulus information.
Distributed neural ensembles can emergently represent external causes.
The model links biological representation to information geometry and active inference.
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to leverage the free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference, to develop a generic, generalizable model of the representational capacities of living creatures; that is, a theory of phenotypic representation. Given their ubiquity, we are concerned with distributed forms of representation (e.g., population codes), whereby patterns of ensemble activity in living tissue come to represent the causes of sensory input or data. The active inference framework rests on the Markov blanket formalism, which allows us to partition systems of interest, such as biological systems, into internal states, external states, and the blanket (active and sensory) states that render internal and external states conditionally independent of each other. In this framework, the representational capacity of living creatures emerges as a consequence of their…
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