The ATHENA Class of Risk-Limiting Ballot Polling Audits
Filip Zag\'orski, Grant McClearn, Sarah Morin, Neal McBurnett, Poorvi, L. Vora

TL;DR
The paper introduces the ATHENA class of risk-limiting ballot polling audit rules, which are more efficient than traditional BRAVO rules for round-by-round audits, reducing ballot counts significantly in US elections.
Contribution
It proposes risk-limiting stopping rules for round-by-round audits, proving their efficiency and providing open-source implementations, improving over existing ballot polling methods.
Findings
ATHENA halves ballots needed in 2016 US Presidential election scenarios.
ATHENA reduces ballots by over 25% for low margins compared to BRAVO.
ATHENA is risk-limiting when the round schedule is pre-determined.
Abstract
The main risk-limiting ballot polling audit in use today, BRAVO, is designed for use when single ballots are drawn at random and a decision regarding whether to stop the audit or draw another ballot is taken after each ballot draw (ballot-by-ballot (B2) audits). On the other hand, real ballot polling audits draw many ballots in a single round before determining whether to stop (round-by-round (R2) audits). We show that BRAVO results in significant inefficiency when directly applied to real R2 audits. We present the ATHENA class of R2 stopping rules, which we show are risk-limiting if the round schedule is pre-determined (before the audit begins). We prove that each rule is at least as efficient as the corresponding BRAVO stopping rule applied at the end of the round. We have open-source software libraries implementing most of our results. We show that ATHENA halves the number of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Electoral Systems and Political Participation
