Possibility conditions for Open Access

TL;DR

This paper models the conditions under which scientific agents would choose open access, analyzing the strategic interactions and incentives that influence the adoption of free knowledge sharing in academia.

Contribution

It formalizes a game-theoretic framework to explore the feasibility and conditions for open access in scientific publishing.

Findings

Editors prefer toll access despite other agents favoring open access.

Strategic incentives influence open access adoption.

Model highlights the importance of agent utilities and beliefs.

Abstract

This is an attempt to formalize the conditions of possibility for free, libre, open access to scientific knowledge within a game. The challenge is to enunciate the terms under which agents participating in the Grand conversation of science would be willing to open share, exchange, negotiate or surrender their contributions, considering their corresponding intentions, goals, beliefs and expected utilities. Many conclusions can be drawn from the game here described. We have made many simplifying decisions along the modelling process that must be taken into account as a determining context for those conclusions, of course. It can be safely state, however, that under the current conditions of the game, Editors will keep betting on Toll Access, knowledge distribution models even if all the other Academic agent go for Open Access.