BasicBlocker: ISA Redesign to Make Spectre-Immune CPUs Faster
Jan Philipp Thoma, Jakob Feldtkeller, Markus Krausz, Tim G\"uneysu,, Daniel J. Bernstein

TL;DR
BasicBlocker is an ISA redesign that eliminates speculative execution to enhance security against microarchitectural attacks while maintaining near-competitive performance.
Contribution
It introduces BasicBlocker, a universal ISA modification applicable to common architectures, enabling non-speculative CPUs to achieve performance comparable to speculative ones.
Findings
BasicBlocker effectively prevents Spectre-style attacks.
BBRISC-V achieves near-competitive performance without speculation.
The approach simplifies security analysis of CPU architectures.
Abstract
Recent research has revealed an ever-growing class of microarchitectural attacks that exploit speculative execution, a standard feature in modern processors. Proposed and deployed countermeasures involve a variety of compiler updates, firmware updates, and hardware updates. None of the deployed countermeasures have convincing security arguments, and many of them have already been broken. The obvious way to simplify the analysis of speculative-execution attacks is to eliminate speculative execution. This is normally dismissed as being unacceptably expensive, but the underlying cost analyses consider only software written for current instruction-set architectures, so they do not rule out the possibility of a new instruction-set architecture providing acceptable performance without speculative execution. A new ISA requires compiler and hardware updates, but these are happening in any…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
