Two's Company, Three's a Crowd: Consensus-Halving for a Constant Number of Agents
Argyrios Deligkas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros Hollender

TL;DR
This paper investigates the computational and query complexity of the $ ext{ε}$-Consensus-Halving problem with a constant number of agents, revealing a complexity dichotomy for monotone valuations and establishing PPA-completeness and lower bounds.
Contribution
It establishes a complexity dichotomy for two versus three or more agents with monotone valuations and connects the problem to a monotone Borsuk-Ulam problem, advancing understanding of its computational hardness.
Findings
Two agents with monotone valuations: polynomial-time solvable.
Three or more agents with monotone valuations: PPA-complete.
For general valuations, the problem is PPA-complete even with two agents.
Abstract
We consider the -Consensus-Halving problem, in which a set of heterogeneous agents aim at dividing a continuous resource into two (not necessarily contiguous) portions that all of them simultaneously consider to be of approximately the same value (up to ). This problem was recently shown to be PPA-complete, for agents and cuts, even for very simple valuation functions. In a quest to understand the root of the complexity of the problem, we consider the setting where there is only a constant number of agents, and we consider both the computational complexity and the query complexity of the problem. For agents with monotone valuation functions, we show a dichotomy: for two agents the problem is polynomial-time solvable, whereas for three or more agents it becomes PPA-complete. Similarly, we show that for two monotone agents the problem can be solved with…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Game Theory and Voting Systems
