A convergence analysis of the price of anarchy in atomic congestion games
Zijun Wu, Rolf H. Moehring, Chunying Ren, Dachuan Xu
TL;DR
This paper analyzes how the price of anarchy in atomic congestion games converges for both pure and mixed Nash equilibria, providing insights into the efficiency loss in such strategic settings.
Contribution
It offers a comprehensive convergence analysis of the price of anarchy in atomic congestion games with unsplittable demands, covering both pure and mixed equilibria.
Findings
Convergence properties of PoA in atomic congestion games.
Differences in PoA behavior between pure and mixed equilibria.
Insights into efficiency loss in strategic congestion scenarios.
Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive convergence analysis of the PoA of both pure and mixed Nash equilibria in atomic congestion games with unsplittable demands.
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