Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication
Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky

TL;DR
This paper investigates the computational complexity of designing optimal signaling schemes in Bayesian persuasion, demonstrating tractability under certain distributional assumptions and providing algorithms for symmetric and independent cases.
Contribution
It introduces polynomial-time algorithms for symmetric distributions and a constant-factor approximation for independent distributions, overcoming general NP-hardness.
Findings
Optimal signaling schemes are tractable under symmetry assumptions.
A polynomial-time algorithm for symmetric distributions is developed.
A constant-factor approximation algorithm is proposed for independent distributions.
Abstract
The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal communication (or signaling) scheme for the sender. It enables the sender to disclose information to the receiver in a way as to incentivize her to take an action that is preferred by the sender. Finding the optimal signaling scheme is known to be computationally difficult in general. This hardness is further exacerbated when there is also a constraint on the size of the message space, leading to NP-hardness of approximating the optimal sender utility within any constant factor. In this paper, we show that in several natural and prominent cases the optimization problem is tractable even when the message space is limited. In particular, we study…
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