Natural Strategic Abilities in Voting Protocols
Wojciech Jamroga, Damian Kurpiewski, Vadim Malvone

TL;DR
This paper introduces a graded security framework for voting protocols based on the complexity and resources needed for strategic voter behavior, demonstrated through a case study on coercion resistance.
Contribution
It proposes a novel approach to security that accounts for user behavior complexity and resource expenditure, applied to electronic voting protocols.
Findings
Model of voter strategies for receipt-freeness
Measurement of voter effort in strategic actions
Analysis of coercion attack difficulty
Abstract
Security properties are often focused on the technological side of the system. One implicitly assumes that the users will behave in the right way to preserve the property at hand. In real life, this cannot be taken for granted. In particular, security mechanisms that are difficult and costly to use are often ignored by the users, and do not really defend the system against possible attacks. Here, we propose a graded notion of security based on the complexity of the user's strategic behavior. More precisely, we suggest that the level to which a security property is satisfied can be defined in terms of (a) the complexity of the strategy that the voter needs to execute to make true, and (b) the resources that the user must employ on the way. The simpler and cheaper to obtain , the higher the degree of security. We demonstrate how the idea works in a case…
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