Interdependence-Aware Game-Theoretic Framework for Secure Intelligent Transportation Systems
Aidin Ferdowsi, Abdelrahman Eldosouky, Walid Saad

TL;DR
This paper presents a game-theoretic framework to enhance the security of interconnected transportation, communication, and power grid systems against cyber-physical attacks, optimizing backup power deployment to maintain system resilience.
Contribution
It introduces a novel interdependence model and formulates BPS allocation as a Stackelberg game, providing scalable solutions for infrastructure security.
Findings
Stackelberg equilibrium outperforms other strategies
The framework is scalable with infrastructure size
Simulation confirms effectiveness of the proposed approach
Abstract
The operation of future intelligent transportation systems (ITSs), communications infrastructure (CI), and power grids (PGs) will be highly interdependent. In particular, autonomous connected vehicles require CI resources to operate, and, thus, communication failures can result in non-optimality in the ITS flow in terms of traffic jams and fuel consumption. Similarly, CI components, e.g., base stations (BSs) can be impacted by failures in the electric grid that is powering them. Thus, malicious attacks on the PG can lead to failures in both the CI and the ITSs. To this end, in this paper, the security of an ITS against indirect attacks carried out through the PG is studied in an interdependent PG-CI-ITS scenario. To defend against such attacks, the administrator of the interdependent critical infrastructure can allocate backup power sources (BPSs) at every BS to compensate for the power…
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