Preventing active re-identification attacks on social graphs via sybil subgraph obfuscation

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new probabilistic framework and privacy guarantee, called k-symmetry, to effectively prevent active re-identification attacks on social graphs using sybil nodes, validated through empirical results.

Contribution

It proposes a novel probabilistic interpretation of active attacks and demonstrates that k-symmetry, enforceable via the K-Match algorithm, provides strong privacy guarantees against sybil-based re-identification.

Findings

k-symmetry offers sufficient protection against active attacks.

K-Match algorithm enforces k-symmetry effectively.

Empirical results show resistance to strong active re-identification attacks.

Abstract

This paper addresses active re-identification attacks in the context of privacy-preserving social graph publication. Active attacks are those where the adversary can leverage fake accounts, a.k.a. sybil nodes, to enforce structural patterns that can be used to re-identify their victims on anonymised graphs. In this paper we present a new probabilistic interpretation of this type of attacks. Unlike previous privacy properties, which model the protection from active adversaries as the task of making victim nodes indistinguishable in terms of their fingerprints with respect to all potential attackers, our new formulation introduces a more complete view, where the attack is countered by jointly preventing the attacker from retrieving the set of sybil nodes, and from using these sybil nodes for re-identifying the victims. Under the new formulation, we show that the privacy property $k$-symmetry, introduced in the context of passive attacks, provides a sufficient condition for the protection against active re-identification attacks leveraging an arbitrary number of sybil nodes. Moreover, we show that the algorithm K-Match, originally devised for efficiently enforcing the related notion of $k$-automorphism, also guarantees $k$-symmetry. Empirical results on several collections of synthetic graphs corroborate that our approach allows, for the first time, to publish anonymised social graphs (with formal privacy guarantees) that effectively resist the strongest active re-identification attack reported in the literature, even when it leverages a large number of sybil nodes.