On the (in)-approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer
Natalie Collina, S. Matthew Weinberg

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that even slight extensions beyond additive or unit-demand valuations, such as matroid-based valuations, lead to strong computational hardness in approximating revenue maximization for a single seller with a single buyer.
Contribution
It establishes a black-box reduction showing the computational hardness of approximating revenue for matroid-based valuations, extending prior results and proving the limits of efficient algorithms.
Findings
No polynomial-time approximation within 1/m^{1-ε} unless NP ⊆ RP.
Hardness results apply to matroid-based valuations, a subset of Gross Substitutes.
The reduction is nearly tight, matching previous technical frameworks.
Abstract
We consider a revenue-maximizing single seller with items for sale to a single buyer whose value for the items is drawn from a known distribution of support . A series of works by Cai et al. establishes that when each in the support of is additive or unit-demand (or -demand), the revenue-optimal auction can be found in time. We show that going barely beyond this, even to matroid-based valuations (a proper subset of Gross Substitutes), results in strong hardness of approximation. Specifically, even on instances with items and valuations in the support of , it is not possible to achieve a -approximation for any to the revenue-optimal mechanism for matroid-based valuations in (randomized) poly-time unless NP RP (note that a -approximation is trivial).…
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