Demo: iJam with Channel Randomization
Jordan L. Melcher, Yao Zheng, Dylan Anthony, Matthew Troglia, Yanjun, Pan, Ming Li, Thomas Yang, Alvin Yang, Samson Aggelopoulos

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel physical-layer key generation enhancement using channel randomization with reconfigurable antennas and AoD estimation, significantly improving security against multi-antenna eavesdroppers without affecting legitimate communication.
Contribution
It proposes a new channel randomization technique combined with AoD-based estimation to secure key generation, demonstrated by augmenting the iJam protocol and validated on a custom platform.
Findings
Eavesdropper's BER approaches random guessing levels.
Legitimate receiver's BER remains unaffected.
Enhanced security against multi-antenna eavesdroppers.
Abstract
Physical-layer key generation methods utilize the variations of the communication channel to achieve a secure key agreement between two parties with no prior security association. Their secrecy rate (bit generation rate) depends heavily on the randomness of the channel, which may reduce significantly in a stable environment. Existing methods seek to improve the secrecy rate by injecting artificial noise into the channel. Unfortunately, noise injection cannot alter the underlying channel state, which depends on the multipath environment between the transmitter and receiver. Consequently, these methods are known to leak key bits toward multi-antenna eavesdroppers, which is capable of filtering the noise through the differential of multiple signal receptions. This work demonstrates an improved approach to reinforce physical-layer key generation schemes, e.g., channel randomization. The…
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