Towards Distributed Accommodation of Covert Attacks in Interconnected Systems

TL;DR

This paper proposes a distributed detection and accommodation framework for covert attacks in interconnected systems, leveraging communication and local models to identify and mitigate stealthy malicious signals.

Contribution

It introduces novel distributed detection schemes and an accommodation method to neutralize covert attacks, enhancing system resilience against stealthy malicious signals.

Findings

Distributed detection schemes improve attack identification.

Accommodation strategies mitigate abnormal system behavior.

Enhanced resilience against covert attacks in interconnected systems.

Abstract

The problem of mitigating maliciously injected signals in interconnected systems is dealt with in this paper. We consider the class of covert attacks, as they are stealthy and cannot be detected by conventional means in centralized settings. Distributed architectures can be leveraged for revealing such stealthy attacks by exploiting communication and local model knowledge. We show how such detection schemes can be improved to estimate the action of an attacker and we propose an accommodation scheme in order to mitigate or neutralize abnormal behavior of a system under attack.