Distributed Localization in Wireless Sensor Networks Under Denial-of-Service Attacks

TL;DR

This paper introduces a distributed localization algorithm for wireless sensor networks that remains effective under DoS attacks by abandoning compromised sensors, with proven theoretical accuracy and validated through simulations.

Contribution

It proposes a novel distributed localization method resilient to DoS attacks, using an abandonment strategy based on barycentric coordinates, with theoretical guarantees of accuracy.

Findings

The algorithm accurately localizes sensors despite DoS attacks.

Sensors abandon localization when communication is compromised.

Simulation results confirm robustness and effectiveness.

Abstract

In this paper, we study the problem of localizing the sensors' positions in presence of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. We consider a general attack model, in which the attacker action is only constrained through the frequency and duration of DoS attacks. We propose a distributed iterative localization algorithm with an abandonment strategy based on the barycentric coordinate of a sensor with respect to its neighbors, which is computed through relative distance measurements. In particular, if a sensor's communication links for receiving its neighbors' information lose packets due to DoS attacks, then the sensor abandons the location estimation. When the attacker launches DoS attacks, the AS-DILOC algorithm is proved theoretically to be able to accurately locate the sensors regardless of the attack strategy at each time. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated through simulation examples.