Experimental quantum key distribution secure against malicious devices
Wei Li, Victor Zapatero, Hao Tan, Kejin Wei, Hao Min, Wei-Yue Liu,, Xiao Jiang, Sheng-Kai Liao, Cheng-Zhi Peng, Marcos Curty, Feihu Xu, Jian-Wei, Pan

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates a high-speed, chip-based measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution system that remains secure even if devices are maliciously controlled, offering a practical solution for secure communications.
Contribution
It presents the first implementation of a secure QKD system resilient to malicious devices on both measurement and user sides, with high secret key rate and miniaturized components.
Findings
Achieved a secret key rate of 137 bps over 24 dB loss.
Implemented a 1.25 GHz chip-based MDI-QKD system.
Demonstrated security against malicious device control.
Abstract
The fabrication of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems typically involves several parties, thus providing Eve with multiple opportunities to meddle with the devices. As a consequence, conventional hardware and/or software hacking attacks pose natural threats to the security of practical QKD. Fortunately, if the number of corrupted devices is limited, the security can be restored by using redundant apparatuses. Here, we report on the demonstration of a secure QKD setup with optical devices and classical post-processing units possibly controlled by an eavesdropper. We implement a 1.25 GHz chip-based measurement-device-independent QKD system secure against malicious devices on \emph{both} the measurement and the users' sides. The secret key rate reaches 137 bps over a 24 dB channel loss. Our setup, benefiting from high clock rate, miniaturized transmitters and a cost-effective…
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