Hermes Attack: Steal DNN Models with Lossless Inference Accuracy
Yuankun Zhu, Yueqiang Cheng, Husheng Zhou, Yantao Lu

TL;DR
The paper introduces Hermes Attack, a novel method to fully steal DNN models by analyzing unencrypted PCIe traffic, achieving lossless inference accuracy and reconstructing models with identical architecture and parameters.
Contribution
Hermes Attack is the first to exploit unencrypted PCIe traffic for complete DNN model extraction, overcoming challenges posed by closed-source GPU internals and data noise.
Findings
Successfully reconstructed models with identical architecture and parameters.
Achieved lossless inference accuracy on multiple DNN models.
Effective across various GPU platforms and models.
Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) models become one of the most valuable enterprise assets due to their critical roles in all aspects of applications. With the trend of privatization deployment of DNN models, the data leakage of the DNN models is becoming increasingly serious and widespread. All existing model-extraction attacks can only leak parts of targeted DNN models with low accuracy or high overhead. In this paper, we first identify a new attack surface -- unencrypted PCIe traffic, to leak DNN models. Based on this new attack surface, we propose a novel model-extraction attack, namely Hermes Attack, which is the first attack to fully steal the whole victim DNN model. The stolen DNN models have the same hyper-parameters, parameters, and semantically identical architecture as the original ones. It is challenging due to the closed-source CUDA runtime, driver, and GPU internals, as well as…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Advanced Neural Network Applications · Security and Verification in Computing
