CSI-based versus RSS-based Secret-Key Generation under Correlated Eavesdropping
Fran\c{c}ois Rottenberg, Trung-Hien Nguyen, Jean-Michel Dricot,, Fran\c{c}ois Horlin, J\'er\^ome Louveaux

TL;DR
This paper compares CSI-based and RSS-based secret-key generation methods in wireless systems, analyzing their capacities under correlated eavesdropping and high SNR, revealing significant performance differences.
Contribution
It provides a comparative analysis of CSI and RSS-based secret-key capacities considering correlated eavesdropper observations and high SNR conditions, with analytical expressions.
Findings
RSS-based key generation is heavily penalized compared to CSI-based methods.
At high SNR, the capacity penalty is a halved pre-log factor and about 0.69 bits.
The penalty diminishes as the eavesdropper's channel becomes highly correlated.
Abstract
Physical-layer security (PLS) has the potential to strongly enhance the overall system security as an alternative to or in combination with conventional cryptographic primitives usually implemented at higher network layers. Secret-key generation relying on wireless channel reciprocity is an interesting solution as it can be efficiently implemented at the physical layer of emerging wireless communication networks, while providing information-theoretic security guarantees. In this paper, we investigate and compare the secret-key capacity based on the sampling of the entire complex channel state information (CSI) or only its envelope, the received signal strength (RSS). Moreover, as opposed to previous works, we take into account the fact that the eavesdropper's observations might be correlated and we consider the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime where we can find simple analytical…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
