Moore's Paradox and the logic of belief
Andr\'es P\'aez

TL;DR
This paper critiques Hintikka's multimodal logic of belief, proposing a weaker alternative that better captures our intuitive understanding of belief and addresses Moore's Paradox.
Contribution
It introduces a more philosophically sound and less restrictive logical framework for belief, improving upon Hintikka's original system.
Findings
Hintikka's interpretation of doxastic operators is problematic
A weaker logical system better captures belief intuitions
The new framework explains Moore's Paradox more effectively
Abstract
Moores Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I argue that Hintikkas interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically problematic and leads to an unnecessarily strong logical system. I offer a weaker alternative that captures in a more accurate way our logical intuitions about the notion of belief without sacrificing the possibility of providing an explanation for problematic cases such as Moores Paradox.
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Taxonomy
TopicsEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation
