Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

TL;DR

This paper introduces an argumentation-based method for representing and computing pure Nash equilibria in normal form games, leveraging Extended Argumentation Frameworks to enhance understanding and explanation.

Contribution

It presents a novel argumentation-based representation for normal form games and demonstrates how to compute and explain pure Nash equilibria using this approach.

Findings

Correctness of the argumentation-based representation

Theoretical properties of the approach are established

Potential for explaining equilibria to non-experts

Abstract

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.