The Kalam Cosmological Argument Meets The Mentaculus
Daniel Linford

TL;DR
This paper examines the implications of bounce cosmologies for the Kalam Cosmological Argument, analyzing how different theories of time affect the argument's theological conclusions and proposing alternative interpretations consistent with a tensed theory of absolute time.
Contribution
It introduces two novel interpretations of bounce cosmologies that challenge Craig and Sinclair's natural theology by considering a tensed theory of absolute time.
Findings
If time is reducible, causation may be non-causal, allowing things to begin without causes.
If time is not reducible, bounce cosmologies do not justify a supernatural cause.
Two alternative bounce cosmology interpretations are proposed, avoiding the need for divine causation.
Abstract
According to the orthodox interpretation of bounce cosmologies, the universe was born from an entropy reducing phase in a previous universe. To defend the thesis that the whole of physical reality was caused to exist a finite time ago, William Lane Craig and co-author James Sinclair have argued the low entropy interface between universes should instead be understood as the beginning of two universes. Here, I present Craig and Sinclair with a dilemma. On the one hand, if the direction of time is reducible, as friends of the Mentaculus -- e.g., David Albert, Barry Loewer, and David Papineau -- maintain, then there is reason to think that the direction of time and the entropic arrow of time align. But on that account, efficient causation is likely reducible to non-causal phenomena. In consequence, contrary to Craig and Sinclair's theological aims, things can begin to exist without causes.…
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