Potential Field Guided Actor-Critic Reinforcement Learning

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel actor-critic reinforcement learning method that integrates potential-field-based critics with reward-based critics to improve policy evaluation, especially in obstacle avoidance and multi-agent cooperation.

Contribution

The paper proposes combining potential-field-based critics with reward-based critics in actor-critic RL, enhancing policy evaluation using prior information and planning.

Findings

Effective obstacle avoidance demonstrated in predator-prey game

Potential field integration accelerates policy learning

Improves multi-agent cooperation with prior information

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the problem of actor-critic reinforcement learning. Firstly, we extend the actor-critic architecture to actor-critic-N architecture by introducing more critics beyond rewards. Secondly, we combine the reward-based critic with a potential-field-based critic to formulate the proposed potential field guided actor-critic reinforcement learning approach (actor-critic-2). This can be seen as a combination of the model-based gradients and the model-free gradients in policy improvement. State with large potential field often contains a strong prior information, such as pointing to the target at a long distance or avoiding collision by the side of an obstacle. In this situation, we should trust potential-field-based critic more as policy evaluation to accelerate policy improvement, where action policy tends to be guided. For example, in practical application, learning to avoid obstacles should be guided rather than learned by trial and error. State with small potential filed is often lack of information, for example, at the local minimum point or around the moving target. At this time, we should trust reward-based critic as policy evaluation more to evaluate the long-term return. In this case, action policy tends to explore. In addition, potential field evaluation can be combined with planning to estimate a better state value function. In this way, reward design can focus more on the final stage of reward, rather than reward shaping or phased reward. Furthermore, potential field evaluation can make up for the lack of communication in multi-agent cooperation problem, i.e., multi-agent each has a reward-based critic and a relative unified potential-field-based critic with prior information. Thirdly, simplified experiments on predator-prey game demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.