Improving the Security of "Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Communication without Encryption"
Nayana Das, Goutam Paul

TL;DR
This paper analyzes existing measurement-device-independent quantum communication protocols, identifies security vulnerabilities allowing information leakage, and proposes modifications to enhance their security without relying on encryption.
Contribution
It reveals security flaws in prior protocols and introduces improvements to prevent information leakage in measurement-device-independent quantum communication.
Findings
Existing protocols are vulnerable to information leakage.
A third party can access half of the secret information.
Proposed modifications improve protocol security.
Abstract
Recently in 2018, Niu et al. proposed a measurement-device-independent quantum secure direct communication protocol using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs and generalized it to a quantum dialogue protocol (Niu et al., Science bulletin 63.20, 2018). By analyzing these protocols we find some security issues in both these protocols. In this work, we show that both the protocols are not secure against information leakage, and a third party can get half of the secret information without any active attack. We also propose suitable modifications of these protocols to improve the security.
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