Towards Identifying Human Actions, Intent, and Severity of APT Attacks Applying Deception Techniques -- An Experiment
Joel Chacon, Sean McKeown, Richard Macfarlane

TL;DR
This paper investigates how deception techniques using honey items in honeypots can distinguish between automated and manual APT attacks, aiding detection and severity assessment.
Contribution
It introduces a method for classifying APT interactions based on honey item engagement, demonstrating the effectiveness of deception techniques in attack differentiation.
Findings
Automated attacks can be distinguished from manual attacks via interaction patterns.
Honey items are effective in classifying attack severity.
Deception techniques improve detection of structured APT attacks.
Abstract
Attacks by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have been shown to be difficult to detect using traditional signature- and anomaly-based intrusion detection approaches. Deception techniques such as decoy objects, often called honey items, may be deployed for intrusion detection and attack analysis, providing an alternative to detect APT behaviours. This work explores the use of honey items to classify intrusion interactions, differentiating automated attacks from those which need some human reasoning and interaction towards APT detection. Multiple decoy items are deployed on honeypots in a virtual honey network, some as breadcrumbs to detect indications of a structured manual attack. Monitoring functionality was created around Elastic Stack with a Kibana dashboard created to display interactions with various honey items. APT type manual intrusions are simulated by an experienced…
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