Keyed Non-Parametric Hypothesis Tests
Yao Cheng, Cheng-Kang Chu, Hsiao-Ying Lin, Marius Lombard-Platet,, David Naccache

TL;DR
This paper introduces keyed non-parametric hypothesis tests as a novel defense mechanism against poisoning attacks in machine learning, leveraging secret keys to prevent adversaries from misleading the tests.
Contribution
It proposes a new primitive that enhances hypothesis testing security by incorporating secret keys, providing a robust method to detect tampered datasets under adversarial conditions.
Findings
The keyed tests effectively detect tampered datasets.
The approach prevents adversaries from misleading the test conclusions.
It offers a new direction for AI security against poisoning attacks.
Abstract
The recent popularity of machine learning calls for a deeper understanding of AI security. Amongst the numerous AI threats published so far, poisoning attacks currently attract considerable attention. In a poisoning attack the opponent partially tampers the dataset used for learning to mislead the classifier during the testing phase. This paper proposes a new protection strategy against poisoning attacks. The technique relies on a new primitive called keyed non-parametric hypothesis tests allowing to evaluate under adversarial conditions the training input's conformance with a previously learned distribution . To do so we use a secret key unknown to the opponent. Keyed non-parametric hypothesis tests differs from classical tests in that the secrecy of prevents the opponent from misleading the keyed test into concluding that a (significantly) tampered…
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