The Concept of Fact in German Physics around 1900: A Comparison between Mach and Einstein

TL;DR

This paper compares Mach and Einstein's differing interpretations of the concept of fact, highlighting their philosophical distinctions and the broader historical context within German physics around 1900.

Contribution

It provides a detailed analysis of the contrasting views of Mach and Einstein on the nature of facts, illustrating their impact on physics philosophy and history.

Findings

Mach viewed facts as real, complex natural event combinations.

Einstein saw facts as results of experience and included theoretical elements.

The differences reflect broader tensions in German physics circa 1900.

Abstract

The concept of fact has a history. Over the past centuries, physicists have appropriated it in various ways. In this article, we compare Ernst Mach and Albert Einstein's interpretations of the concept. Mach, like most nineteenth-century physicists, contrasted fact and theory. He understood facts as real and complex combinations of natural events. Theories, in turn, only served to order and communicate facts efficiently. Einstein's concept of fact was incompatible with Mach's, since Einstein believed facts could be theoretical too, just as he ascribed mathematical theorizing a leading role in representing reality. For example, he used the concept of fact to refer to a generally valid result of experience. The differences we disclose between Mach and Einstein were symbolic for broader tensions in the German physics discipline. Furthermore, they underline the historically fluid character of the category of the fact, both within physics and beyond.