Towards Understanding Man-on-the-Side Attacks (MotS) in SCADA Networks
Peter Maynard, Kieran McLaughlin

TL;DR
This paper introduces Man-on-the-Side (MotS) attacks in SCADA networks, demonstrating their feasibility through practical experiments and analyzing detection methods, highlighting a new threat model for critical infrastructure security.
Contribution
It is the first to experimentally implement and analyze MotS attacks in SCADA and enterprise networks, providing insights into detection and mitigation strategies.
Findings
MotS attacks can successfully inject packets without detection
Victims accept injected packets without suspicion
Existing IDS may not reliably detect MotS attacks
Abstract
We describe a new class of packet injection attacks called Man-on-the-Side Attacks (MotS), previously only seen where state actors have "compromised" a number of telecommunication companies. MotS injection attacks have not been widely investigated in scientific literature, despite having been discussed by news outlets and security blogs. MotS came to attention after the Edward Snowden revelations, which described large scale pervasive monitoring of the Internet's infrastructure. For an advanced adversary attempting to interfere with IT connected systems, the next logical step is to adapt this class of attack to a smaller scale, such as enterprise or critical infrastructure networks. MotS is a weaker form of attack compared to a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM). A MotS attack allows an adversary to read and inject packets, but not modify packets sent by other hosts. This paper presents practical…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Network Security and Intrusion Detection · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
