Designing Direct Matching Mechanism for India with Comprehensive Affirmative Action
Orhan Ayg\"un, Bertan Turhan

TL;DR
This paper proposes a centralized matching mechanism for India's affirmative action system, addressing shortcomings in current indirect procedures by incorporating merit, vertical and horizontal reservations, and OBC de-reservations.
Contribution
It introduces new choice rules and a centralized mechanism to improve fairness and efficiency in implementing India's complex reservation policies.
Findings
Designed choice rules considering merit and reservations
Proposed a centralized clearing mechanism for matching markets
Addresses shortcomings of existing indirect reservation procedures
Abstract
Since 1950, India has been implementing the most comprehensive affirmative action program in the world. Vertical reservations are provided to members of historically discriminated Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Classes (OBC). Horizontal reservations are provided for other disadvantaged groups, such as women and disabled people, within each vertical category. There is no well-defined procedure to implement horizontal reservations jointly with vertical reservation and OBC de-reservations. Sequential processes currently in use for OBC de-reservations and meritorious reserve candidates lead to severe shortcomings. Most importantly, indirect mechanisms currently used in practice do not allow reserve category applicants to fully express their preferences. To overcome these and other related issues, we design several different choice rules for institutions…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSoutheast Asian Sociopolitical Studies
