Dynamic Pricing and Mean Field Analysis for Controlling Age of Information
Xuehe Wang, Lingjie Duan

TL;DR
This paper introduces a dynamic pricing strategy to incentivize real-time information sharing among mobile users, using mean field analysis to control the age of information across multiple zones efficiently.
Contribution
It develops a closed-form approximate dynamic pricing scheme and extends it to a multi-zone mean field game system for decentralized AoI control.
Findings
Closed-form solution for approximate dynamic pricing.
Simplified $\varepsilon$-optimal pricing scheme.
Decentralized mean field pricing for multi-zone AoI management.
Abstract
Today many mobile users in various zones are invited to sense and send back real-time useful information (e.g., traffic observation and sensor data) to keep the freshness of the content updates in such zones. However, due to the sampling cost in sensing and transmission, a user may not have the incentive to contribute the real-time information to help reduce the age of information (AoI). We propose dynamic pricing for each zone to offer age-dependent monetary returns and encourage users to sample information at different rates over time. This dynamic pricing design problem needs to well balance the monetary payments as rewards to users and the AoI evolution over time, and is challenging to solve especially under the incomplete information about users' arrivals and their private sampling costs. After formulating the problem as a nonlinear constrained dynamic program, to avoid the curse…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAge of Information Optimization · IoT Networks and Protocols
