A Game Theoretic Framework for Model Based Reinforcement Learning
Aravind Rajeswaran, Igor Mordatch, Vikash Kumar

TL;DR
This paper introduces a game theoretic framework for model-based reinforcement learning that unifies and generalizes existing algorithms, improving sample efficiency and scalability in complex tasks.
Contribution
It develops a novel Stackelberg game approach to MBRL, providing a unified, principled basis for designing stable and efficient algorithms with rich function approximators.
Findings
Algorithms are highly sample efficient
Match asymptotic performance of model-free policy gradient
Scale well to high-dimensional tasks like dexterous hand manipulation
Abstract
Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) has recently gained immense interest due to its potential for sample efficiency and ability to incorporate off-policy data. However, designing stable and efficient MBRL algorithms using rich function approximators have remained challenging. To help expose the practical challenges in MBRL and simplify algorithm design from the lens of abstraction, we develop a new framework that casts MBRL as a game between: (1) a policy player, which attempts to maximize rewards under the learned model; (2) a model player, which attempts to fit the real-world data collected by the policy player. For algorithm development, we construct a Stackelberg game between the two players, and show that it can be solved with approximate bi-level optimization. This gives rise to two natural families of algorithms for MBRL based on which player is chosen as the leader in the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsReinforcement Learning in Robotics · Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Smart Grid Energy Management
