Asymptotic Security of Control Systems by Covert Reaction: Repeated Signaling Game with Undisclosed Belief
Hampei Sasahara, Serkan Saritas, Henrik Sandberg

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that control systems can achieve asymptotic security by employing covert reactions, making attacker beliefs converge to benign behavior, and highlighting the importance of information concealment for resilience.
Contribution
It introduces a novel framework for analyzing signaling games with undisclosed beliefs, showing how covert reactions ensure security by preventing attacker belief updates.
Findings
Attacker beliefs converge to benign behavior with covert reactions.
Reveals the explicit link between resilience and information concealment.
Provides a new analytical framework for signaling games with hidden beliefs.
Abstract
This study investigates the relationship between resilience of control systems to attacks and the information available to malicious attackers. Specifically, it is shown that control systems are guaranteed to be secure in an asymptotic manner by rendering reactions against potentially harmful actions covert. The behaviors of the attacker and the defender are analyzed through a repeated signaling game with an undisclosed belief under covert reactions. In the typical setting of signaling games, reactions conducted by the defender are supposed to be public information and the measurability enables the attacker to accurately trace transitions of the defender's belief on existence of a malicious attacker. In contrast, the belief in the game considered in this paper is undisclosed and hence common equilibrium concepts can no longer be employed for the analysis. To surmount this difficulty, a…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSmart Grid Security and Resilience · Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis · Game Theory and Applications
