Learning to Detect Malicious Clients for Robust Federated Learning
Suyi Li, Yong Cheng, Wei Wang, Yang Liu, Tianjian Chen

TL;DR
This paper introduces a framework for federated learning that detects and removes malicious client updates, enhancing robustness against attacks like Byzantine failures and model poisoning.
Contribution
A novel detection-based framework enabling the central server to identify and eliminate malicious updates in federated learning systems.
Findings
Effective detection of malicious updates in federated learning
Resilience against Byzantine and poisoning attacks demonstrated
Improved robustness in image classification and sentiment analysis tasks
Abstract
Federated learning systems are vulnerable to attacks from malicious clients. As the central server in the system cannot govern the behaviors of the clients, a rogue client may initiate an attack by sending malicious model updates to the server, so as to degrade the learning performance or enforce targeted model poisoning attacks (a.k.a. backdoor attacks). Therefore, timely detecting these malicious model updates and the underlying attackers becomes critically important. In this work, we propose a new framework for robust federated learning where the central server learns to detect and remove the malicious model updates using a powerful detection model, leading to targeted defense. We evaluate our solution in both image classification and sentiment analysis tasks with a variety of machine learning models. Experimental results show that our solution ensures robust federated learning that…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
